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COMMENT
INTERPRETING THE WTO AGREEMENTS-
A COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR
PAUWELYN'S APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
In his paper, Professor Pauwelyn argues that pursuant to Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention),' the Appellate Body should consider other rules of
international law in the interpretation of the WTO Agreements, when
that law reflects the "common intentions" of the parties to the WTO. He
argues that this does not mean that "all the parties to the WTO treaty
must have formally and explicitly agreed, one after the other, to the new
non-WTO rule; nor even that this rule must be otherwise legally bind all
WTO members; but rather, that this new rule can be said to be at least
implicitly accepted or tolerated by all WTO members, in the sense that it
can reasonably be considered to express the common intentions or
understanding of all members as to the meaning of the WTO term
concerned.
' 2
This Comment is divided into three parts. The first part will analyze
the Vienna Convention in order to determine whether it provides textual
support for Professor Pauwelyn's approach. The second part will inquire
into the systemic implications of his approach for the WTO, and for its
connection with public international law. The final part will consider the
implications of Professor Pauwelyn's approach for the legitimacy of the
WTO, and conclude with some general observations on the relationship
between the Vienna Convention and the WTO.
I. PROFESSOR PAUWELYN'S ARGUMENTS AND
THE VIENNA CONVENTION
The Vienna Convention Article 31 (3)(c) refers to applicable "rules of
international law." A rule of international law is only applicable to a State
if it is legally bound by that rule. This understanding of when an interna-
tional law rule applies for the purpose of Vienna Convention Article
31(3)(c) is confirmed by the Vienna Convention Article 2(1)(g), which
1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 31(3)(c), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
2. Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can
We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 575-76 (2001) (emphasis added).
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defines a "party" as "a State which has consented to be bound by the
treaty and for which the treaty is in force." This means that in the case of
a WTO dispute, at a minimum, that the parties to the WTO dispute
would also need to be parties to the treaty; legally bound by the rule of
international law.
In contrast, Professor Pauwelyn argues that the Appellate Body can
interpret the WTO Agreements by reference to other rules of interna-
tional law when that rule represents the common intentions of all WTO
members. Therefore, in order for his approach to remain consistent with
Vienna Convention Article 31 (3)(c), we need to interpret his approach as
also requiring that the international law rule, at a minimum, be legally
binding on the parties to a WTO dispute.
While the Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c) requires that rules of
international law be binding on the parties to the WTO dispute, there is
nothing in the text that indicates that this is a sufficient as distinct from a
necessary condition. It therefore remains an open question how many
member States of the WTO, over and above those member states that are
party to the WTO dispute, need to be legally bound by the rule of inter-
national law.
In order to answer this question we need to inquire into the meaning
of the Vienna Convention's qualification of the "rule of international
law" with the phrase that it be applicable "between the parties."3 One
approach is to consider how the phrase has been used in other articles of
the Vienna Convention. The Appellate Body in EC-Hormones endorsed
this method of treaty interpretation, when it stated that a treaty inter-
preter is not entitled to assume that the use of different words in different
parts of the text was inadvertent.' The necessary implication being that
the use of the same words in different parts of a text indicate that these
words should be given the same meaning.
The Vienna Convention Article 31 refers to "the parties" four times.
The first reference is in Article 3 1(2)(a), which states that the context for
the purpose of treaty interpretation includes "any agreement relating to
the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty." (Emphasis added). In this Article, the word
"all" qualifies the phrase "between the parties." This suggests that the
absence of the word "all" to qualify the phrase "between the parties" in
Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c) means that not all the parties to the
WTO need to be parties to the rule of international law.
3. Id. at 575.
4. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, 164 (1998).
[Vol. 25:917
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We are therefore left with the conclusion that the text of the Vienna
Convention does not definitively answer how many States need to be
legally bound by the rule of international law for the purposes of Article
31(3)(c). Instead, the Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c) only bounds
our inquiry. At a minimum we know that the parties to the WTO dispute
must be legally bound by the rule of international law, and that it is not
necessary for the rule of international law to be legally binding on all
WTO members.
II. PROFESSOR PAUWELYN'S ARGUMENTS AND
THEIR SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS
Professor Pauwelyn's approach fits within these boundaries outlined
by Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c). It is consistent with the minimal
requirement that the international rule be binding on those WTO mem-
bers who are parties to a WTO dispute, while requiring that the
international law rules reflect the "common intentions" of the WTO
membership suggests that the international law rule needs to be legally
binding on some, but not all WTO members. In order to bring into relief
the systemic implications for the WTO of Professor Pauwelyn's ap-
proach, this section will analyze the systemic implications of adopting
either of these opposing interpretations of Article 31 (3)(c) for the WTO.
A. "Between the Parties" as all the Parties to the WTO
Should the Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c) be understood as re-
ferring to only those rules of international law that are legally binding on
all WTO members, this would effectively preclude the Appellate Body
from taking into account most rules of public international law when
interpreting the WTO. This is because the WTO has a membership of
one hundred and forty six States, which means that there are very few
treaties that have been consented to by all WTO members.
One of the implications of this is that WTO law would become sig-
nificantly less receptive to changes in public international law, and
would instead need to rely on the member States to adopt interpretations
of the WTO Agreements to reflect changes in international law. While
this may not appear an undesirable result, according to the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Article IX(2), the
WTO membership cannot adopt an interpretation of the WTO Agree-
ments unless there is a three-fourth majority. Therefore, in practice the
WTO membership is limited in its ability to adopt interpretations of the
WTO Agreements.
Summer 20041
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In his paper, Professor Pauwelyn's understanding of the WTO as
firmly embedded within the system of public international law is part of
the underlying rationale that drives his approach to Vienna Convention
Article 31(3)(c). While an interpretation of the Vienna Convention Arti-
cle 31(3)(c) as referring to all the parties to the WTO leaves intact the
relationship of the WTO with public international law, the inability of
the WTO to be interpreted by the Appellate Body to reflect those rules of
international law that are widely accepted, if not consented to by all
WTO members, severely limits the extent to which the WTO is able to
reflect and respond to the larger body of public international law rules.
The WTO as part of public international law would therefore be reduced
to a mere formality and its jurisprudence would become devoid of the
significance that Professor Pauwelyn desires.5
Finally, some writers have also observed that where the Appellate
Body has interpreted the WTO in light of other rules of public interna-
tional law, that this has added to its legitimacy by taking into account
values that are widely accepted in the international community, and
which are reflected in other international regimes.6 Further, it is clear that
the mere fact that all WTO members have not consented to another
treaty is not dispositive of that treaties international acceptance. For ex-
ample, the United States has not consented to the Vienna Convention,'
yet the Convention has received such widespread acceptance by the in-
ternational community that Vienna Convention Articles 31(1) and 32
have achieved the status of rules of customary international law.' There-
fore, to the extent that the Appellate Body is unable to interpret the WTO
Agreements in light of other rules of international law because these
rules are not legally binding on all WTO members, this will limit the
sensitivity of the WTO to the diverse values that public international law
embodies, thereby contributing to the perception that Appellate Body
decisions lack legitimacy.9
5. See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 2.
6. Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade Organization, in THE LEGITI-
MACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 386 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heikanen eds.,
2001).
7. Note absence from official list of treaties in force at http://www.state.gov/s//
24224.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). See also Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to
Ratify Int'l Criminal Court, AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. (2002), at http://www.asil.org/
insights/insigh87.htm (last visited May 9, 2004).
8. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17 (1996).
9. See generally Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis, I




B. "Between the Parties" as only the Parties
to the WTO Dispute
Pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 3.2, deci-
sions of the Appellate Body do not create binding precedent.' °
Nevertheless, the Appellate Body has held that adopted Panel reports
create legitimate expectations among the parties to the dispute." As a
result, the Appellate Body and Panel rely on the reasoning and conclu-
sions of previous Appellate Body reports to support their own
conclusions. This has led the parties to a WTO dispute to frame their
arguments in light of previous Appellate Body interpretations of the
WTO agreements, and to legitimately expect either that Appellate Body
decisions will follow the reasoning in previous Appellate Body deci-
sions, or that reasoned explanations will be provided when this is not the
case. This development of a de facto body of judicial precedence is also
consistent with one of the goals of WTO dispute settlement, which, ac-
cording to the Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 3.2, is to
provide " ... security and predictability to the multilateral trading sys-
tem."
One of the consequences of the Appellate Body taking into account
in its interpretation of the WTO Agreements only those rules of interna-
tional law applicable between the parties to the dispute, is that this will
effectively limit the relevance of its reasoning to the parties to the dis-
pute. This will undermine the de facto precedential role that Appellate
Body reports have come to play in the dispute settlement system. This
would also make the outcomes of WTO disputes less predictable, as par-
ties are less able to rely on previous Appellate Body decisions as guides
on how it would approach a similar problem, which may ultimately dis-
courage parties from resorting to the dispute settlement mechanism in
the first place.
A final observation is that any interpretation of the WTO Agree-
ments that undermines the precedence of Appellate Body reports will
lead to a greater fragmentation of law within specialized organizations
such as the WTO. Further, because Appellate Body decisions themselves
form part of the corpus of international law, fragmentation of jurispru-
dence within the WTO will also translate to a greater fragmentation of
public international law.
10. See DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 38 (1999); see also Appellate
Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS/8/AB/R at 13
(1996).
11. See Japan-Alcohol, supra note 10, at 13.
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CONCLUSION
The approach advocated by Professor Pauwelyn regarding the appli-
cation of Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c) to the WTO tries to avoid
some of the pitfalls associated with both of the interpretative approaches
canvassed above. By arguing that the Appellate Body should interpret
the WTO Agreements in light of those rules of international law that are
not necessarily legally binding on all WTO members, but which reflect
the "common intentions" of all the WTO members, he attempts to avoid
the fact that there are very few treaties that have been consented to by all
WTO members, while allowing the Appellate Body to refer to those
rules of international law that have achieved wide spread support from
the WTO membership. Further, by suggesting that international law
should be binding on more than the parties to the WTO dispute, Profes-
sor Pauwelyn attempts to avoid the systemic implications that arise
should the Appellate Body interpret the WTO Agreements by taking into
account only those rules of international law that are only legally binding
on the parties to the WTO dispute.
Nevertheless, the rules of international law that determine how
States can be bound by international law constitute rules of recognition.' 2
These rules are themselves normative, and compliance with them confers
formal legitimacy on public international law. 3 Therefore, any conclu-
sion as to the systemic implications of Professor Pauwelyn's approach
needs to weigh the value to the international system that formal legiti-
macy conveys on public international law, as against Professor
Pauwelyn's results-orientated approach. This question is outside the
scope of this paper, suffice for a preliminary observation, that a particu-
larly strong and cogent alternative would be required to justify deviating
from the international rules of recognition.
Finally, the limitations and uncertainties highlighted above with the
two textual understandings of the Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c),
may point to a problem not with the rules of recognition but with the
Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation. The Vienna Convention
is forty-five years old and the International Law Commission produced
draft rules on treaty interpretation as early as 1966.14 International law
has come a long way since then, and as a result, the Vienna Conventions'
articles on treaty interpretation may no longer provide adequate guid-
12. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 42
(1995).
13. See id. at 26; J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Eumpe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403,
2468 n. 186 (1991).
14. RALF GUNTER WETZEL, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES:
TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES 239 (Dietrich Rauschining ed., 1978).
[Vol. 25:917
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ance to the Appellate Body on how to deal with the interface between
large multilateral treaty regimes and other international law rules.
JOSHUA MELTZER
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade5
SJD Candidate, University of Michigan Law School
15. The views expressed in this Comment are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the view of DFAT or the Australian Government.
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